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ABSTRACT
Many proposed and actual environmental taxes are taxes on intermediate
goods. These goods, such as fossil fuels, are typically tradable, and they are also
used in the production of many tradable final goods. How should imports of
intermediate and final goods be taxed if the government does not want environmental
tax policy to alter the competitive positions of domestic and foreign producers? Not
surprisingly, imports of the intermediate good itself can be taxed at the same rate as
domestic intermediate goods. Imports of final goods that are produced using these
intermediate goods can be taxed based on their intermediate good intensity, provided
there is no joint production. Under conditions of joint production, however, such as
those that characterize the petroleum refining and petrochemical industries, it is
difficult to define the intermediate good intensity of any single product. Arbitrary
assignments of intermediate good content, for example on the basis of output weight
or value, are unlikely to preserve the competitive positions of domestic and foreign
producers.
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Executive Summary
Many proposed and actual environmental taxes are taxes on intermediate
goods. These goods, such as fossil fuels, are typically tradable, and they are also
used in the production of many tradable final goods. How should imports of
intermediate and final goods be taxed if the government does not want environmental
tax policy to alter the competitive positions of domestic and foreign producers? This
is an important and growing issue in tax policy design, and it is particularly relevant
to trade between resource-rich developing nations and currently developed nations.
Not surprisingly, imports of the intermediate good itself can be taxed at the same rate
as domestic intermediate goods. Imports of final goods that are produced using these
intermediate goods can be taxed based on their intermediate good intensity, provided
there is no joint production.
When several final goods are produced jointly using the taxed intermediate
good, however, it is difficult to define the intermediate good intensity of any single
product. Yet these are precisely the conditions that characterize two of the industries
that are most directly affected by environmental taxes: petroleum refining and
petrochemicals. This paper explains how actual tax policies have attempted to
measure intermediate good content in such joint production situations, and explores
the degree to which alternative approaches will preserve the competitive positions of
foreign and domestic firms. We present a simple example in which taxing imported
final goods based on the "natural" definition of intermediate good intensity raises the
marginal cost of foreign producers by less than the increase in marginal costs for
domestic producers, who directly face the intermediate good tax.
The problem of allocating joint intermediate good inputs across different final
goods, while not a prominent issue in tax policy discussions, closely parallels a
perennial problem in regulatory economics. This is the question of how to allocate
joint fixed costs of production across various outputs of regulatory firms when setting
prices for such a firm. Previous work in regulatory theory has shown the limitations
of arbitrary cost allocation rules, based for example on the value, quantity, or weight
of various joint outputs. Tax policy-makers must recognize that similar problems are
likely to plague the design of "border tax adjustments" associated with environmental
taxes.
Tax policies are increasingly being used as instruments of environmental policy.
Recent proposals to tax carbon fuels in the European Community and the United
States are motivated at least as much by concerns about the effects of fossil fuel
combustion on global climate as by revenue needs. In the United States, reductions
r; in consumption of chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) to comply with the terms of the 1987
Montreal Protocol have been achieved in part through a federal tax on products that
contain CFCs. Growing environmental concern in both developed and developing
nations suggests that the use of such taxes is likely to increase in the future.
The basic principles of environmental tax design are well understood. Diamond
(1973) and Sandmo (1975) show that each commodity's tax rate should equal the
aggregate value, over all households, of the commodity's marginal externalities. Such
a system of commodity taxes is equivalent to a Pigouvian tax on the externality itself.
In practice, measuring the environmental consequences of each good is difficult, and
a tax system that imposes a different tax rate on each good is administratively
complex. Practical environmental tax policies therefore typically tax a small set of
goods associated with particularly significant externalities. These goods are often
intermediate goods, such as fossil fuels.
To avoid placing domestic producers at a competitive disadvantage, proposals
to tax domestic production of intermediate goods are usually coupled with plans to
tax imports at the same rate as domestically-produced intermediate goods. Imports
of final goods that are produced using the taxed intermediate good are more
problematic. Not taxing such imports would place domestic producers at a
disadvantage, and encourage offshore production, but determining the taxed-good
content of finished goods can be difficult.
How imported finished goods should be taxed depends critically on the
government's objective. If it is concerned about pollution at home, but assigns no
penalty to pollution elsewhere, and if the production process in question generates
only local pollution, then it may not be concerned about encouraging production
elsewhere. If the government's objective is to reduce the level of emissions
everywhere, either because of concerns for the welfare of citizens of other nations or
because the production process generates global externalities, as for example in the
case of ozone-depleting chemicals, then policies that simply rearrange the geography
of production will seem unattractive.
In this paper, we consider alternative policy rules for imputing taxes to imported
final goods, when the government's objective is to levy the same effective tax on
foreign and domestic producers. This objective is equivalent to raising the marginal
cost of foreign and domestic producers by the same amount. We show that provided
there is no joint production, an import tax based on the intermediate good intensity
of domestic production achieves this goal. When final goods are produced jointly,
however, it is difficult to assign intermediate good consumption to particular final
goods. This problem is analogous to the problem of allocating joint costs in regulatory
proceedings that must set prices for multiproduct firms, and in most cases, the
definition of the intermediate good content of a given product is arbitrary. We explore
the problems this poses for the design of international tax policy.
This paper is divided into six sections. The first describes the current treatment
3
of imported products under the U.S. environmental excise tax system. The second
section considers the taxation of finished goods in a competitive industry that
exhaustively uses a taxed intermediate good, and derives the tax on imported final
goods that raises marginal costs for foreign and domestic producers by the same
amount.
Section three generalizes the analysis to the case of a multiproduct firm that
uses the intermediate good in the joint production of several final goods. When
goods are produced jointly, border tax adjustments that neglect this fact can place
domestic final good producers at a competitive disadvantage relative to foreign
producers. The fourth section shows rigorously that a social planner who attaches
the same disutility to consumption of intermediate inputs at home and abroad would
set the same tax rates on domestic and foreign producers.
Section five explores the potential link between the stylized models of joint
production that we consider, and actual production and marketing practices in the
petroleum refining and petrochemical industries. These industries use crude oil as an
intermediate input in the joint production of many different products, and their
products are subject to many environmental taxes. A brief concluding section
describes several directions for future work.
41. Current Practices: Imported Goods & U.S. Environmental Excise Taxes
The U.S. government currently levies three environmental excise taxes: a
Superfund tax on petroleum, a tax on ozone-depleting chemicals (ODCs), and a tax
on toxic chemicals other than ODCs. The tax on petroleum and petroleum products
is levied at a rate of 9.7 cents per barrel of crude oil or petroleum product, or less
than one percent of the current world price of crude oil. The tax on ODCs is levied
on a set of chemical compounds, principally chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs).
Manufacturers who use ODCs must report the number of pounds of each ODC that
they used, and then compute their tax bill using a schedule with different tax rates on
different chemicals. The 1993 tax rate on most CFCs is $3.35 per pound. Finally,
the tax on chemicals other than ODCs specifies a list of forty-two chemicals, primarily
hydrocarbons and metal compounds, with associated tax rates. The 1993 tax rate
for many hydrocarbons, for example butane, ethylene, toluene, and xylene, is $4.87
per ton; the rates on metal compounds vary widely. A copy of IRS Form 6627,
Environmental Taxes, which specifies the taxed goods and their tax rates, is shown
as Figure 1.
Each of these taxes includes a provision for treatment of imported products.
Under the Superfund tax, imports of petroleum products are taxed at the same Mr
barrel rate as crude oil received at U.S. refineries. This treatment of imports implies
different burdens on U.S. and foreign refiners, since refineries consume some of their
crude inputs in production. A tax on domestic refinery inputs equal to the per-barrel
tax on imported refinery outputs places a higher tax burden on domestic than foreign
5production. If a fraction s of each barrel of input is consumed during refining, then
a tax of one dollar on domestic inputs translates to a 1/(1-s) dollar tax on imported
refinery outputs, not a one dollar tax as currently imposed.
The tax legislation on ozone-depleting chemicals includes explicit provisions for
imports of products containing ODCs. The tax on "an imported taxable product ... is
computed by reference to the weight of the ODCs used as materials in the
manufacture of the product." (U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, 26 CFR 52.4682.3).
There are several ways for an importer to determine the tax basis of a product
containing ODCs: (i) the exact method, which requires documentation on the weight
of each ODC used in production; (ii) the table method, which can be used for the
small set of products for which the U.S. Treasury has estimated the typical ODC use
in U.S. production'; and (iii) the value method, which specifies that "if an importer
cannot determine the ODC weight ... under the exact method ... and the table ODC
weight of the product is not specified, the tax imposed on the product ... is one
percent of the entry value." (26 CFR 52.4682.3). Table 1 presents examples of items
that are listed in the table of imported ODC-using products.
The U.S. tax on chemicals other than ODCs treats imports in a fashion similar
to the tax on ODCs. The tax rate on imported products that embody 50% or more
of taxable chemicals, measured either by weight or value, is set equal to the tax that
would have been collected if the taxable chemicals used in production had been sold
'This table was compiled from a U.S. Treasury survey of firms producing various
products using ODCs.
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in the United States. In the absence of any information regarding the content of non-
ODC taxable chemicals, the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe a tax rate based
on the use of taxable substances in the predominant method of production for the
imported product2, or the Secretary may impose a five percent ad valorem tax on
imported chemical products.
2. Import Neutrality Without Joint Production
The imported product tax rules described above are designed for the case in
which inputs are exhaustively used in producing a given output. For example, if
ethylene and benzene are combined to produce ethylbenzene, with no economicallyv-
significant chemical byproducts, then it is straightforward to compute the amount of
the two taxed inputs, ethylene and benzene, in a given quantity of ethylbenzene. This
section formalizes the problem of taxing imports when producing the product in
question exhaustively consumes a given set of inputs. This provides a starting point
for our subsequent discussion of import taxation with joint production.
We assume that a final good (Q) is supplied by both domestic and foreign
producers using inputs of labor (L) and an intermediate good (E). Foreign and
domestic production are denoted by superscripts F and D respectively. Domestic and
2The IRS Cumulative Bulletin (1989-1, page 718) provides an example to help
chemical firms compute the tax on imports of non-ODC taxed chemicals. In this
example, .75 pounds of benzene are reacted with .28 pounds of ethylene to produce
one pound of ethylbenzene, so the tax rate on ethylbenzene is .75*rbmo +
.
2 8 *T,,,th,,. The Cumulative Bulletin explains that this calculation corresponds to the
Friedel-Crafts alkylation process, which is the predominant means of producing
ethylbenzene.
7foreign wages, wD and wF, may differ, but there is an integrated world market for the
intermediate good, which has a unit price of e. Initially, both domestic and foreign
firms provide this good to the domestic market, so pD = pF
The total cost function for domestic producers is cD(QD, e, wD), where QD is the
quantity of domestic output, and the analogous cost function for foreign producers
is cF(QF, e, wF). If foreign and domestic producers are perfectly competitive, then in
the pre-tax equilibrium,
cDo(Q, e,WD) = pD = p F= CFoQF, , j. (1)
A specific tax of 0 is levied on domestic consumption of the intermediate good raises
the domestic price to e + 8, under the assumption that the world price of the
intermediate good is not affected by the domestic tax. The change in the price of the
domestically produced good is therefore
dp D = CcD(OQDe, WD),*. (2)
Since the derivative of the cost function with respect to the input price for the
intermediate good equals the demand for the intermediate good, conditional on output
level QO, equation (2) could be re-written as dpD = (8E/8aQ) e , where 8E/aQD is the
change in the quantity of E required to increase output (QD) by a single unit. To
preserve the competitive positions of domestic and foreign firms, imports must bear
a tax T such that T = dpD = (aE/aQD)* 8 .
Regulations that set the import tax equal to the amount of input needed to
produce the final good under the predominant means of domestic production implicitly
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assume that production exhibits constant returns. In this case, marginal and average
input requirements coincide, and the change in domestic producer prices associated
with a given tax can be estimated from the input-output coefficient relating E to QD.3
To raise the marginal cost of foreign and domestic producers by the same
amount, the tax on imported final goods must be based on the importance of the
intermediate good in domestic production.4 Current tax regulations that allow
importers to pay taxes equal to the actual amount of intermediate good used in
production, subject to documentation, therefore may not raise marginal costs of
foreign and domestic producers by the same amount. Importers will presumably take
advantage of their option to provide specific documentation only when their inputs of
the taxed intermediate goods are below the average level of inputs for domestic
producers. Of course, if the government's objective is to reduce global environmental
externalities, then shifting production from high-externality domestic firms toward
less-polluting foreign producers may be attractive.
3The IRS Cumulative Bulletin 1989-1 is explicit in stating that "for purposes of
computing the rate of tax for a taxable substance, the term 'conversion factor' means
the number of tons of each taxable chemical consumed in the manufacture of one ton
of the taxable substance..." (p. 717).
4The tax that achieves import neutrality is closely related to the tariff that provides
zero "effective protection" to an industry; see Corden (1987).
93. ImDort Neutrality with Joint Production
In the last section, the intermediate good was fully consumed in producing the
final good. This made it straightforward to measure the quantity of the intermediate
good that is embodied in the final good. When several final goods are produced jointly
from an intermediate good, however, such assignment is difficult. Joint production
processes are extremely common in some of the industries that produce taxed goods;
petroleum refining and petrochemicals are examples that are discussed below.5 This
section illustrates the problems of taxing imported final goods with a simple example
of a joint production technology.
We assume that two goods, q, and q2, are jointly produced according to the
following production functions:
q, =minl[ , (3)
8 h
and
42=min[ 2 ]. (4)82 h9
Labor input must be dedicated to the production of one good or the other, but the
intermediate good input is "public" in the sense that over some ranges of output,
production of one good can be increased without raising intermediate good inputs.
The production technology described in (3) and (4) exhibits constant marginal costs
5Leffler (1979) and Burdick and Leffler (1990)- provide readable introductions to
the technology of the petroleum refining and petrochemical industries, respectively.
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of producing goods 1 and 2.
Figure 2 summarizes the supply behavior of a price-taking firm facing the
production function given by (2) and (3). If the price of either good 1 or good 2 is
below the marginal cost of the labor required to produce it, 61w and 62w, respectively,
the firm will not produce this good. Even when p, and p2 both exceed the marginal
labor cost required for production, however, the firm may not supply any output, since
it must also cover the cost of intermediate good inputs. The break-even condition for
the firm to produce both goods is:
P1 P2  8 1 2+ =e+[-+-J * w. (5)h, h h, h(
This expression equates the marginal cost of jointly producing 1/h, units of good 1
and 1/h2 units of good 2 to the marginal revenue from selling these goods. The
relative quantities of goods 1 and 2 in this expression are set by their relative
intermediate good input requirements, which dictate that a firm producing both goods
will set q2 = (hl/h 2)*ql.
If h2  O0, there is no joint production and the intermediate good content of
good one is a, = h,, since producing one unit of good one requires hi units of E. If
h1 and h2 are both non-zero, however, what is the intermediate good intensity of good
one? Since one unit of intermediate input E produces 1/h, units of good one and 1/h2
units of good two, the intermediate good intensities of goods one and two, a, and a2,
must satisfy:
C--I --• =. 16)
While this condition ensures that a, < hl, so that the intermediate good intensity of
good 1 is strictly less than the amount of the intermediate good needed to produce
one unit of good 1, it does not provide a precise value for a,.
Analyzing how producer prices respond to a change in the cost of intermediate
goods requires assumptions about the elasticity of demand for goods 1 and 2, as well
as the elasticity of supply of labor. We consider the case in which good one is traded
in international markets, while good two is a production by-product that is sold in the
domestic market. We further assume that labor is elastically supplied at a fixed wage,
w, and that the demand for good 2 is perfectly elastic in each nation. Foreign and
domestic firms therefore face the same price for good one, but they may face
different prices, P2F and p2, respectively, for their output of good two.
These assumptions imply that a tax on the intermediate good will be fully
reflected in the price of good 1.6 Holding w and p2 fixed, we differentiate (6) with
respect to e and find dp, = h+*(de/de)*0. When de/dO = 1, the tax on imports of
good one that raises marginal costs by the same amount for domestic and foreign
producers is T = h, *0. But we know from above that the share of the intermediate
6The question we consider is a standard tax incidence problem: how will an
increase in the price of the intermediate good be reflected in the prices of the two
final goods and wage rate? Our assumptions that the wage is fixed, and that the
demand for good two is infinitely elastic at a given price, determine the outcome that
all of the price adjustment occurs in the price of good one. Relaxing these
assumptions would lead to some adjustment in other prices as well.
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good embodied in good one is a, < h,. Thus a tax on imports based on the
intermediate good intensity of good one, defined as the increase in the inputs of E that
are needed to produce one more unit of good one, will raise marginal costs for foreign
producers by less than the cost increase for domestic producers. This result obtains
when both foreign and domestic producers employ the same technology, and could
even obtain in some cases when foreign producers use more intermediate input per
unit of output than domestic producers. This finding suggests that intermediate good
intensity may not be an appropriate standard for choosing border tax adjustments
associated with domestic environmental taxes.7
4. The Government Objective Function and Imoort-Neutrality
The previous discussion takes the government's objective of raising the
marginal costs of domestic and foreign producers by the same amount as given. In
this section, we show that the optimal tax chosen by a social planner who is equally
concerned with externalities generated abroad and at home will exhibit this property.
We illustrate this by modifying the joint production function of the last section
to allow for diminishing returns to labor input. Outputs q, and q2 are therefore jointly
produced according to:
7Braeutigam (1980) explains that in regulatory contexts, a number of arbitrary
rules have been used to solve similar problems of joint cost attribution. The
parameters a, and a2 might be set by the relative physical weights of the two outputs,
or by their relative market values, or by the relative variable costs that can be
attributed to each of these products. Yet only under restrictive conditions will any of
these rules yield welfare-maximizing prices for the various regulated goods.
qD-min[gLJ5, E 1 (7)(h,
and
D E=min[g(L2 ,I  (8)
As before, good 1 is both produced domestically and imported, while good 2 is not
tradable. ED denotes domestic consumption of the intermediate good. We assume
the social planner maximizes the utility of a representative consumer who has an
additively-separable utility function in goods 1, 2, labor supplied, and the externality
associated with consumption of E both at home (ED) and abroad (EF):
W= U(qD+qF2+ 5 q2 .q-p,F _q1F D _. D-e*ED-p*(ED+Eq (9)
We have normalized the domestic wage to unity, and use q,F to denote imports of
good 1, which cost plF per unit. The parameter B denotes the reduction in utility for
each unit of E consumed, whether at home or abroad. The problem of choosing the
optimal tax on the foreign good is now equivalent to choosing qF, and in so doing,
the social planner recognizes the effect of producing good 1 abroad on the level of
energy consumption abroad (EF), and the associated level of externalities generated.
We assume that foreign production takes place under conditions of constant
marginal cost, which simplifies the problem, and that the production functions for q F
and q2F are respectively qF = min [L,1 , EF/hl] and q2F = min [L2F,EF/h 2]. With a fixed
wage abroad and infinitely elastic demand for good 2, which fixes p2F, the break-even
condition derived in the last section requires that
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phF ,F- .  (10)
In addition, as we derived in the last section, dEF/dqF = hi. Thus we can replace EF
in equation (9) with h, *q, . This fact, along with the relationship ED = h1 *f(LD),
allows us to rewrite the representative consumer's utility function as:
W = U(I(L Di)+qi+ Vq q-plF, 4l-L -1[q 2D-e*hi *I(L D)-P *(h, *fL D) +h1 *q/.
(11)
The government's control variables are domestic labor input, the quantity of
good one imported, and the quantity of good two produced domestically. The first
order condition for the optimal choice of q F is:
U/= pF +,p*hl, (12)
This condition implies that the optimal tax that the social planner would levy on
imports of good 1 equals B*h,. This is the utility cost of the externality associated
with consumption of E times the quantity of E consumed in producing another unit of
q F. Inspection of (9) shows that the Pigouvian tax on domestic consumption of E is
also 8. Thus the optimal tax on imported goods, r = h, 
-
, is precisely the optimal
tax on domestic intermediate good use, 6, times the marginal effect of imports of
good 1 on foreign consumption of E.
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5. Potential ApDlications: Petroleum Refining and Petrochemicals
The stylized examples of linear production technologies in the preceding
sections illustrate the problems of taxing imported finished goods, yet they do not
address the practical importance of these problems. Two of the industries that are
best described by our stylized analysis are petroleum refining and petrochemical
production. This section briefly outlines the production processes in these industries,
and notes the similarities, as well as differences, with our modelling above.
Crude oil and most refined petroleum products are traded in active global
markets. In 1991, the United States imported 5.78 million barrels per day of crude
oil, and 1.79 million barrels of refined petroleum products (Annual Energy Review
(1991, p. 123)). Crude oil is an intermediate input in the production of refined
petroleum products, so nearly one quarter of U.S. petroleum imports are "finished
goods" for purposes of our analysis. The United States imports a wide range of
refined products.
Refining is the production process that transforms crude oil into a range of
petroleum products. The critical feature of crude oil, explained for example in Leffler
(1979), is that it is a complex mixture of many hydrocarbons. The refining process
separates these different components, and in some cases also initiates chemical
reactions that transform some component hydrocarbons into others. Refining is a
textbook example of a joint production process. The refining process produces
gasoline, kerosene, distillate oil, residual fuel oil, asphalt, and a range of other
petroleum products. Although the characteristics of the crude oil input and the
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specification of the refinery process can affect the relative amounts of the various
outputs that are produced from a barrel of crude oil, it is essentially impossible to
produce only a single product from crude oil input. For example, even though most
U.S. refineries are designed to maximize gasoline output per barrel of crude oil input,
gasoline accounts for less than half of refinery output.
The difficulty of determining the share of intermediate inputs, such as crude oil,
in outputs, such as gasoline, is illustrated in Table 2. The table shows the output mix
of refineries in various regions. There are substantial differences in gasoline's share
in refinery output between the United States (46%) and all other regions (20% in
Asia, 18% in Africa and the former Soviet Union). The share of residual fuel oil is
correspondingly much higher in other countries than in the United States. The
parameter hi in our preceding analysis, the amount of a given input that is needed to
produce a unit of the final good, thus would vary for gasoline-crude oil across nations.
Table 3 presents some evidence on the source of these differences, describing the
technological characteristics of the refining industry in different countries. This table
shows the nature of the refinery capacity in the United States and the five countries
from which the U.S. imported the largest volume of petroleum products in 1991.8
The processes in Table 3 are presented in approximately increasing order of
sophistication, with vacuum distillation and thermal methods the least sophisticated,
and catalytic hydro-treating and hydro-reforming the most complex. There are
81n 1991, imports from Saudi Arabia were 1.80 million barries per day, Canada,
1.03, Venezuala, 1.01, Mexico, .80, and Nigeria, .70; see Annual Energy Review
(1991, p.125).
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significant differences in the set of processes used in different countries. Venezuala,
for example, relies more heavily on non-catalytic refinery methods, distillation and
other thermal methods, than the U.S. or any of the other nations shown. Catalytic
reforming, a process that is designed to increase the output of high-octane gasoline
from a given input of crude oil, is relatively more common in Mexico than elsewhere.
These technological differences further suggest that there may be differences between
the U.S. and the nations from which we import petroleum products in the input-output
coefficients for these products.
A key issue in applying our analytical framework to the market for refined
petroleum concerns the assumption that some products are traded in world markets,
while others are not. Leffler (1979) discusses the "bottom of the barrel," the
products such as asphalt, road oil, and coke that are left over after the production of
higher-value products such as gasoline. These products, while tradable, are relatively
low value and therefore tend not to be transported. The United States, for example,
imported only 2,000 barrels per day of petroleum coke in 1992, compared with
domestic production of 596,000 barrels." The fact that these products are
nevertheless tradable suggests that the simple framework developed above may need
to be modified before analyzing these markets.
Better examples of tradable and non-tradable joint products can be found in the
petrochemical industry. This industry is a downstream segment of the refining
industry, which produces a range of synthetic hydrocarbons used in plastics, resins,
9American Petroleum Institute (1993), Table 18d.
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and a wide range of other manufactured products. Burdick and Leffler (1990)
describe many of the principal products of this industry, and the chemical processes
by which they are produced. Joint production is ubiquitous in this industry.
To illustrate the difficulty posed by joint production, consider the case of
benzene, one of the products taxed under the U.S. Superfund tax. There are several
ways to obtain benzene, all involving joint production. For example, ethylene and
propylene are produced by "cracking" naphtha in an olefin plant, yielding benzene as
a byproduct. More than 20% of the U.S. supply of benzene now results from this
production process (Burdick and Leffler, 1990, p. 32). While benzene is actively
traded, ethylene is not; it is similar to the untraded good in our analysis above.10
Reuben and Burstall (1973) write that
...like propylene and the butenes, ethylene is a gas and it
is inconvenient to transport. It is normally used near its
point of production... One unexpected consequence of [this]
... is that very little [ethylene] is bought or sold except
at secret contract prices, and it is difficult to know at
what price it changes hands in large quantities. (p.197)
Ethylene in turn is used as an intermediate good in the production of various
polyethylene compounds as well as ethylene oxide, ethylene gycol, ethyl benzene, and
ethyl alcohol.
l'Waddams (1973) provides further support for the difficulty of transporting some
petrochemical products in his discussion (p. 296) of ethylene production in the U.S.
and Europe. He describes the greater reliance on naphtha as an input to the cracking
process in Europe, and the greater prevalence of joint products from this method
rather than the ethane-based methods of ethylene production more common in the
United States. He also indicates that the rate of growth in demand for ethylene's joint
products in Europe is a key factor affecting the economics of the naphtha-based
process.
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A U.S. producer of both benzene and ethylene would be taxed on both products
(see Figure 1). A foreign producer supplying benzene to the U.S. market, however,
would not face a comparable tax on ethylene output. This could imply a smaller
increase in the marginal production cost for foreign than domestic producers.
6. Conclusion and Future Directions
This paper examines a problem that arises in many aspects of international tax
policy: how should tax rates be set to avoid providing a competitive advantage to
either domestic or foreign producers? We show that standard prescriptions based on
the case of exhaustive production, when all inputs are consumed in producing a single
final good, do not carry over to the more complex case of joint production. Moreover,
we argue that the very notion of the embodied intermediate good content of a joint
product is poorly defined, even though this is the concept that typically underlies
actual attempts to design tax policies.
This paper does not provide a constructive suggestion on how to set
appropriate border taxes in general. Rather, our simple examples highlight that the tax
rate that raises marginal costs for foreign and domestic producers by the same
amount will depend on conditions in the markets for each of the joint products, as
well as conditions in the markets for other factors that are used to produce the joint
products. Simple, general rules for border tax adjustment are not available.
The issues considered in this paper arise in a variety of public policy contexts
that involve subsidization or regulation of joint production, and not just in tax design.
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Subsidizing one of several joint products, or regulating one product, may reduce the
equilibrium price that producers can charge for the other joint products. For example,
unintended subsidies to the production of carbon dioxide are apparently one
consequence of U.S. government subsidies to ethanol.
The administrative difficulties that arise in taxing internationally-traded joint
products are inherent to multijurisdictional tax systems. International coordination of
tax policies, which can ensure that all joint products face similar tax burdens, provides
one method of reducing these difficulties.
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Table 1: U.S. Imputation of Ozone Depleting Chemical Content of Imports
Imputed ODC Weight 1993 Tax Burden
Household Freezers
Computer Keyboards
Telephones, Value > $11
VCRs
Foam Chairs
Passenger Cars with
Air Conditioning
Source: U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, 26 CFR 52.4682.3, pp. 24-27.
Product
2.40 Ibs.
0.07
0.10
0.06
0.30
4.00
$8.04
0.20
0.27
0.16
1.01
13.07
-------------------------------------------------- --~------~------- ------------
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Table 2: Refinery Output Mix, by Region, 1990
Gasoline Distillate Residual Other
United States
Canada
Mexico, Central &
South America
Western Europe
Middle East
Africa
Asia
Eastern Europe &
Former Soviet Union
45.9%
35.3
24.0
24.7
14.1
18.0
20.0
18.3
19.3%
26.7
25.2
31.7
28.9
27.7
29.5
24.4
6.3%
8.4
28.1
18.9
33.6
29.6
24.6
33.5
Source: American Petroleum Institute, 1993, Basic
Number 3 (September), and authors' calculations.
Petroleum Data Book volume XIII,
28.6%
29.6
22.7
24.7
23.4
24.7
25.8
23.8
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